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One of the major challenges in the neuroscience of consciousness is to disclose the 
timing and neural mechanisms underlying visual awareness, the subjective experience 
of seeing. Electroencephalography (EEG) studies investigating the time course of 
consciousness-related neural processes have found two potential correlates of visual 
awareness: the N2 and the P3 ERP components. However, recent works have 
suggested that only N2 correlates to visual awareness, whereas later neural activity 
expressed by the P3 component reflects post-perceptual processes related to subjects’ 
report or to accumulation of sensory evidence leading to decision-making.  
Building upon this observation, the objective of this study was to provide further 
evidence that the P3 component reflects a post-perceptual process. To this end, we 
designed two EEG experiments in which we directly manipulated decision making 
processes and visual awareness while keeping constant the physical property of visual 
stimuli. This experimental manipulation allowed us to identify the possible influences 
of post-perceptual processing over the time course of neural responses and determine 
the temporal window at which such influence occurs.  
In Experiment 1, we manipulated participant’s decision criterion by inducing, 
respectively, a liberal and a conservative decision bias in two different experimental 
sessions. The aim of this first Experiment was to determine whether our manipulation 
of the decision processes would produce a modulation of P3 ERP component. 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that participants were not 
requested to adjust their decision criterion (own criterion session). The aim of this 
experiment was to examine whether in a condition in which there was no manipulation 
of post-perceptual processes, N2 and P3 ERP component would distribute differently. 
Electrophysiological and Behavioral results of Experiment 2 were then compared with 
those of Experiment 1.  
If the amplitude of the P3 reflects post-perceptual processes related to decision making 
processes, one would expect to find some differences in the topography or in the time-
course of the P3 between the condition in which a decision criterion was imposed 
(Experiment 1) and the condition in which there was not a decision bias induced  
(Experiment 2).  
ERP results of Experiment 1 revealed that the amplitude of the N2 and the P3 
components were enhanced for those trials were subjects reported to have seen the 
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stimulus as compared to unaware trials. Importantly, the amplitude of the P3 was 
modulated by the decision criterion: it was enhanced when participants adopted the 
liberal criterion compared to the conservative criterion, suggesting that P3 reflects 
brain processes related to decision making that occurs after that awareness has 
emerged. 
ERP data of Experiment 2 confirmed that aware responses were associated with 
enhanced N2 and P3 amplitude than unaware responses. Interestingly, the decision 
criterion manipulation had an effect on P3 component revealing that the own and the 
liberal criteria were associated with an increased positivity over central areas if 
compared to the conservative criterion. In addition, we found that the amplitude of 
the N2 was enhanced for the own session if compared to conservative and liberal 
sessions.  
Overall these results suggest that when sensory information was relevant for the task 
(own session) a bigger N2 was observed. On the contrary, P3 amplitude was sensitive 
to the manipulation of the decision criterion, suggesting a critical role of neural activity 
expressed by the P3 component in decision making processes. These findings support 
the hypothesis that P3 might reflect post-perceptual processes that occur after that 
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1.1 The Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
Amongst the many unsolved questions in Neuroscience, one that has challenged and 
excited researchers during the last decades is the search for the neural basis of 
conscious perception, which involves the attempt to find out a causal link between 
neural states and conscious states. The goal is to determine whether a particular 
conscious experience correlates with a specific neural activation and flow of 
information processing that distinguish it from other mental states (Dehaene and 
Naccache, 2001). 
Thus, one of the major aims of current research on neurobiological basis of 
consciousness is to find the Neural Correlates of Consciousness defined as “the minimal 
neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any specific conscious percept” (Koch, 2004). The word 
minimal is emphasized in this definition because the question of interest is to find 
which are those neural substrates whose activity is actually needed for a particular 
conscious experience (Tononi and Koch, 2008). For example, the neural correlates of 
perceiving a face correspond to that pattern of neural activity, whose activation, enable 
us to consciously experience that face.  
 Koch’s definition has two implications on consciousness research. First of all, the 
neural correlates supporting a specific content of experience, (i.e., a face) are different 
from the neural correlates supporting another experience (i.e., a cat). So, different 
contents of consciousness lead to different neural correlates (Koch et al., 2016; De 
Graaf and Sack, 2015). Moreover, Koch’s emphasis on sufficiency indicates that not 
all neural processes that correlate to consciousness should be considered a NCC (Koch 
et al., 2016; Tononi et al., 2016a), but it may be that some of them have facilitative 
effects on consciousness, i.e. attention, while others represent a consequence of 
conscious perception, i.e. working memory updating (Aru et al., 2012; De Graaf and 




1.2 How can we study NCC? 
Most of the knowledge that we have accumulated during the last decades on NCC 
comes from studies in visual perception. In fact, the possibility of selectively 
manipulating visual percepts has made vision a particular advantageous modality for 
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investigating the correlation between neural events and conscious perception. NCC of 
visual awareness, which is defined as the subjective of seeing (Searle, 1992; Block, 
1995), are also the main subject of this investigation, and accordingly we will mainly 
focus our attention on consciousness research concerning visual system. 
There are different paradigms that can be used to study visual awareness, but in a 
typical experimental setting, visual awareness is manipulated to produce condition that 
differ with respect to conscious perception (the so-called contrastive method; 
Baars,1988). The content of awareness reported by the participant is assessed using 





Basically, in the contrastive method paradigms (Figure 1), the physical properties of 
the stimulus are kept constant while awareness is experimentally manipulated, so that, 
approximately in half of the trials observers are able to detect the stimuli (aware 
Figure 1. Contrastive method: Example of a contrastive method paradigm based on 
subject’s report. The physical properties of the stimulus are kept constant, but 
awareness fluctuates across trials due to experimental manipulation (i.e. masking 
paradigm). Participants press a button when they perceive a stimulus (in this case 
seeing a face) and another button when they do not see the stimuli. Then, brain 
activity elicited by detected stimuli (seeing a face) is contrasted to brain activity related 
to undetected stimuli (not seeing a face). Thus, the brain activity isolated with this 
contrast is thought to reflect neural basis of visual awareness (figure from Koch et 
al., 2016). 
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condition) while in the other half of trials they are not (unaware condition). The basic 
principle of this method is that if the stimuli does not change whereas observer’s 
awareness fluctuates between conscious and unconscious states, as a consequence, the 
difference in neural activity between these two states should not be attributed to the 
property of the stimulus but to changes in visual awareness (Aru et al., 2012; De Graaf 
et al., 2012). 
 There are several paradigms that can be used to find the minimum intensity of 
stimulus that can be detected 50% of the time, the so called absolute threshold. One 
of these is the method of constant stimuli (Urban, 1910). In this procedure, the 
experiment chooses a fixed range of stimuli intensities, some of which are above 
observers’ threshold while others below his/her threshold. On each trial one of these 
stimuli is randomly presented to the participant, who has to report whether detected 
the target or not. The absolute threshold corresponds to that stimulus’ intensity value 
that elicits aware responses on 50% of the trials. 
Behavioural measures of consciousness are used to quantify how much an 
experimental subject is conscious of a visual stimulus (Irvine, 2013), and are divided 
into objective and subjective measures (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984; Seth et al.; 2008). 
Subjective measures are based on participants’ report of their mental state (Seth et al.; 
2008), for example a subject has to report verbally or by button press if a stimulus was 
present or not. However, the fundamental problem of this method is that it relies on 
the assumption that all mental states are accessible to conscious report (Timmermans 
and Cleeremans, 2015) and thus, it does not take into account that, a subject may report 
to have not seen a stimulus not because he/she does not have knowledge about it but, 
because he/she is too conservative in responding or he/she has a very low confidence 
(Timmermans and Cleeremans, 2015).   
Objective measures are based on the ability of the observer to choose between 
different alternatives (Seth et al., 2008). The conscious experience of the subject is then 
estimated from participants’ performance in the task. An example is the two forced 
choice paradigm, in which, on each trial the subject is forced to choose between two 
alternatives which one is the correct and, even if he is not sure about the answer he is 
forced to guess. According to this view, a success in discriminating between alternative 
stimuli is an index of awareness whereas a failure indicates unawareness. So, the main 
difference between these two methods is that subjective measures of awareness are 
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based directly on participants’ report, while objective measures use statistical analysis 
to assess participants performance in the task (Irvine, 2013). 
Signal detection theory (SDT; Green and Swets, 1996) is a statistical framework used 
on perception studies in order to provide an objective, response bias free, measure of 
consciousness (Irvine, 2012).  It is widely applied to investigate decision-making 
processes under condition of uncertainties and bias.  
The starting point of SDT is that decision processes are not exclusively based on 
perceptual information but are taken by filtering such information with an internal 
criterion (Abdi, 2007). So, decision depends on the ability of an observer to 
discriminate a signal from noise as well as from the participants’ criterion (Wickens, 
2002).  
The goal of SDT is to estimate two components of the decision process, sensitivity 
(d’) and criterion (C). Sensitivity is a measure that describes the detectability of a signal. 
Or better, how easily an observer can differentiate a signal from a background noise. 
A d’ > 0 indicates that the observer can easily discriminate the signal. C reflects the 
subjects’ inclination to categorize stimuli as a signal or noise. For example, if the 
amount of evidence for the signal exceeds the decision criterion, the subject says that 
the signal was present, and vice versa. A participant who tend to say “signal absent” is 
taken as an evidence of a conservative bias, whereas a more liberal participant tends to 
say “signal present” more often. Thus, the power of SDT in consciousness studies is 
that it allows to measure the impact of criterion bias on perceptual decision making.  
During the last decades, neuroimaging studies contrasting brain activity associated to 
conscious states with brain activity associated to unconscious states have provided 
important evidence about the anatomical and physiological bases of consciousness. 
Anatomical bases of NCC have been predominantly located in the posterior cortex 
including occipital, parietal and lateral temporal area (Boly, et al., 2017, Tononi et al., 
2016b). The role of the prefrontal cortex in consciousness still remains a question of 
debate. While several authors suggested that prefrontal cortex has a causal role in 
access consciousness (Dehaene, 2014; De Cul, et al., 2009), more recent studies suggest 
that activity in frontal regions may be related to subject’s report or to the cognitive 
processing of the stimulus rather than to conscious perception (Mazzi et al., 2018; 
Kock et al., 2016; Aru et al., 2012). 
Regarding the temporal course of NCC, important advances have been achieved 
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thanks to Event-related potentials (ERPs) method. ERPs are voltage fluctuations 
generated by neural structures in response to a sensory or cognitive event (Luck, 2014). 
They mainly reflect post synaptic field potentials produced by the activity of large 
populations of neocortical pyramidal cells which fire synchronously (Buzsàki et al., 
2012, Nunez and Srinivasan, 2006). ERPs can be elicited by sensory, cognitive or 
motor events (for example the presentation of a visual stimulus) and represent a 
powerful non-invasive approach for investigating the temporal dynamics of neural 
processing with a millisecond resolution (Luck and Kappenmann, 2015; Donchin, 
1981). ERPs are characterized by a sequence of positive and negative deflections 
known as “components”, “peaks” or “waves”. It is commonly accepted that the time-
course of ERP waves following a stimulus reflect the time-course of neural processes 
activated by the same stimulus. The first components observed after stimulus 
presentation (within 100 ms), are called sensorial or exogenous, and are thought to 
depend on the physical properties of the stimulus (Luck, 2012; Coles et al; 1995;). On 
the contrary, later components, which are named cognitive or endogenous, have been 
related to decision and response processes (Luck and Kappenman, 2011; Polich, 2007). 
Thus, analyses on mean peak amplitude, latency and scalp distribution of ERP waves 




1.3 ERP correlates of consciousness 
There are numerous ERP paradigms available to study neural correlates of visual 
awareness, however, the most common approach is based on contrastive method. As 
mentioned above, in a typical experiment the physical stimulation of the retina is kept 
constant throughout the experiment, while conscious experience fluctuates as a result 
of experimental manipulation (for a review of the different ways in which visual 
awareness can be manipulated see Koivisto and Revonuso, 2010). Then, the NCC 
would correspond to the difference between the “aware” and the “unaware” states. 
Another useful strategy to isolate the effect of awareness on ERP components consists 
on computing difference waves (Figure 2B). That is, subtracting the ERP wave for the 
aware condition from the ERP wave for the unaware condition. In this way, the neural 
activity that is common between the two conditions is canceled out while the resulting 
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ERP is thought to reflect the difference in neural processing between detected and 
undetected stimuli.  
The results obtained in several studies using different paradigms for manipulating 
awareness have found two main ERP correlates of visual awareness: an increased 
negativity occurring in the N1-N2 time windows followed by an enhancement of 
positivity observed in the P3 time range (Figure 2A; for reviews see Koivisto and 
Revonuso, 2010; Railo et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 2.  ERP correlate of visual consciousness: (A) Example of a classical ERP 
waveform. The continuous line represents the ERPs in response to detected 
stimuli while the dashes line the ERPs in response to undetected stimuli. Colored 
area indicates the condition differences for the N2 (orange area) and for the P3 
(green area). (B) Use of difference waves to isolate the VAN and the LP. The two 
components were isolated by means of difference waves in which the ERP elicited 
by the detected stimuli was subtracted from the ERP elicited by the undetected 
stimuli. Usually the VAN overlaps in time with the N1-N2 component, whereas 
the LP overalps with the P3 wave. 
 11 
 
Also the amplitude of the P1 has been proposed as a correlate of visual awareness 
(Pins & ffytche, 2003). However, many studies did not find any correlations between 
the P1 and awareness (Koivisto et al., 2008; Lamy et al., 2009; Melloni et al, 2011). It 
has been proposed that neural processes underlying P1 may reflect attentional 
processes (NCC-pr) related to the stimulus before it enters into consciousness rather 
than consciousness itself. 
The presence of two components that correlate to awareness is confirmed by 
difference waves (Figure 2B). Awareness correlates with a negative deflection 
occurring around 200 ms after stimulus presentation, labeled Visual Awareness 
Negativity (VAN) and typically observed at posterior electrodes (occipital, temporal 
and posterior parietal areas; Koivisto and Revonuso, 2003; Tagliabue et al., 2016). The 
VAN is followed by a large positive wave called Late Positivity (LP), occurring after 
300 ms stimulus presentation, that is predominantly observed at occipital and central 
electrodes (Del Cul et al., 2007; Turatto et al., 2002). 
However, during the last years, much of the ongoing debate on neural correlates of 
consciousness is about whether consciousness arises from early activation of posterior 
cortex (within 200 ms) or whether it depends on later brain activity (after 300 ms) 
involving also the prefrontal lobes. The assumption that consciousness arises from the 
functional connectivity between cortical regions of fronto-parietal network is at the 
basis of the global neuronal workspace theory (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). On the 
other hand, more recent studies support the notion that only earlier brain activity in 
the posterior cortex (Boly et al., 2017; Aru et al., 2012) expressed by the VAN 
represents the true correlates of consciousness, whereas the LP reflects higher order 
cognitive processes related to the task or to the stimulus evaluation. 
Consistent support for the hypothesis that P3 does not reflect awareness but post-
perceptual processes came from many ERP studies. For instances, Pitts and colleagues 
(Pitts et al., 2014a) used a modified inattentional blindness paradigm combined with 
EEG recording, in which they systematically varied the task relevance of a critical 
stimulus across different experimental sessions. In a first phase of the experiment a 
unexpected stimulus was presented to the participants who did not noticed it because 
it was task-irrelevant (unaware condition). In a second phase of the experiment the 
participants were aware of the critical stimulus, but it still was irrelevant for the task. 
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In practice, participants did not need accessing perceptual information of the critical 
stimulus for report. Finally, in a third phase, the same stimulus became relevant for the 
task, so that participants need accessing and maintaining perceptual information in 
working memory for report.  
In this way, the authors created a condition in which participants were aware vs 
unaware of identical stimuli without requiring a trial by trial report. Interestingly, 
results showed that only the VAN was consistently observed in all the aware sessions. 
On the contrary, the amplitude of the P3 component was prominent only when the 
critical stimulus was relevant for the task and not when participants were aware of the 
stimulus, but it was task irrelevant. The authors concluded that only the VAN 
correlates to consciousness, whereas the P3 is likely to reflect post-perceptual or 
attention-based process necessary for completing the task. A similar pattern of results 
was replicated in an additional series of experiments carried out by Pitts and colleagues 
(Pitts et al., 2014b). The authors, using a similar inattentional blindness paradigm, in 
which visual awareness and task relevance were independently manipulated, 
investigated whether induced gamma band activity and the P3 wave reflected 
awareness or its consequences (NCC-co). Again, they found that gamma activity and 
the P3 were evident only when the stimuli were relevant to the task, confirming their 
hypothesis that the P3 reflect post-perceptual processes and not consciousness. 
Another study from Koivisto and colleagues (Koivisto et al., 2016a) aimed at 
dissociating NCC from post-perceptual processing using a GO-NOGO paradigm. In 
different sessions participants were asked to respond when they were aware of the 
stimulus and not to respond when they were unaware (aware-GO) or, vice versa, to 
withheld responding when they were aware of the stimulus and responding when they 
were unaware (aware-NOGO). ERP results showed that the VAN was observed in 
both conditions predominantly over occipital and posterior temporal cortex, and was 
not influenced by the request to respond or withhold responding when subjects were 
aware of the stimulus. In contrast, a large LP wave was observed when subjects were 
aware of the stimulus and were requested to respond, suggesting that the amplitude of 
the P3 was related to response requirements. The authors concluded that neural 
activity at occipital areas around 200 ms should be considered the best predictor of 
visual awareness, while the P3 reflects post-perceptual processes. 
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In another study, Koivisto and colleagues (Koivisto et al., 2018), investigated the 
relationship between working memory (a post-perceptual processing) and visual 
consciousness in a dual-task paradigm. Basically, participants had to perform a visual 
detection task while concurrently either temporally maintaining information in their 
memory (maintenance condition) about another stimulus or performing an executive 
task (subjects had to manipulate the content of their working memory by subtracting 
numbers in steps of 3; load condition). Experimenters were interested in investigating 
whether LP amplitude was sensitive to their manipulation of working memory 
processes. Interestingly, results showed that the amplitude of the LP was reduced in 
the load condition compared to the maintaining condition, whereas the VAN 
presented the same amplitude in both conditions. The result that working memory 
processes share common neural resources (LP time-window) required for conscious 
perception were interpreted by the author as an indication that P3 reflects post-










Figure 3. Proposed interpretation of ERP findings in visual awareness 
studies: Colored area indicates the condition differences for the N2 
(orange area) and for the P3 components (green area). The neural 
processes underlying P1 probably do not reflect visual awareness, but 
pre-conscious processes (NCC-pr) related to attention. The N2 (peak 
~200 ms) represents the earliest correlates of visual awareness (NCC 
or true NCC). The P3 might reflect post-perceptual processes or 
consequences of consciousness (NCC-co), such us working memory 
updating or cognitive manipulation of perceptual information. 
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Taken together, these recent studies support the view that visual awareness emerges 
earlier (around 200 ms), and that the VAN is the best predictor of visual consciousness 
(NCC; Figure3). Moreover, anatomical bases of visual consciousness seem to be 
restricted to a posterior cortical hot zone not including the prefrontal areas (Koch et 
al., 2016; Boly et al., 2017; Havlík et al., 2017). Later brain activity (after 300 ms) 
expressed by the P3 component is likely to reflect post-perceptual processes that 
follow conscious perception (NCC-co; Figure3) and to be related to task-monitoring 




The aim of the present study was to provide further evidence that the P3 component 
reflects a post-perceptual process. To this end, we designed two EEG experiments in 
which we directly manipulated post-perceptual processing and visual awareness while 
keeping constant the physical property of the stimuli.  
Participants performed a visual task consisting in discriminating the orientation of 
horizontal or vertical gabor patches presented at perceptual subjective threshold, so 
that sometimes they could be consciously perceived and sometimes not. We 
experimentally manipulated subjects’ decision criterion for reporting target-present 
stimuli by inducing a conservative and a liberal bias in different sessions (Experiment 
1). In Experiment 2 the same participants as in Experiment 1 performed the same task 
but this time they were not instructed to adjust their decision criterion.  
The advantage of this approach was that we created a paradigm in which the subjective 
report of consciousness differs across sessions while the physical property of the 
stimuli was kept constant. This allowed us to test whether post-perceptual processes 
related to decision making differently modulate behavioral and ERPs responses to the 
same stimuli.  
If our manipulation of post-perceptual processes would produce a modulation on the 
P3 component, one could speculate that the P3 does not reflect the phenomenal 
experience per se, but could be related to other cognitive processes which are relevant 
to the task execution but not to consciousness.  
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The aim of Experiment 1 was to determine whether our manipulation of the decision 
criterion would produce a modulation of N2 and P3 ERP components. 
Experiment 2 was conducted to provide further evidence that the P3 component 
reflects differences in post-perceptual processing rather than an index of conscious 
perception. The same participants as in Experiment 1 performed the same task, but 
this time we did not manipulate participants’ decision criteria. Here, we assessed 
whether the N2 and P3 components would be modulated differently from Experiment 
1. This allowed us to compare neural correlates of conscious perception (Experiment 
2) with those underlying decision processes (Experiment 1).  
If the P3 component reflects different post-perceptual processing related to the act of 
criterion setting, we would expect to find a different modulation of P3 amplitude 
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. On the contrary, if the P3 component 
correlates with awareness the amplitude of the P3 component should not vary 





















2. Experiment 1 
2.1 Material and Methods 
2.2 Subjects  
Seventy-three healthy participants were recruited for the experiment. An initial 
threshold assessment (see below) was conducted to determine the stimuli to be used 
in the EEG session of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (see below). The sample 
obtained at the end of Experiment 1 was recalled after a period of at least two weeks 
to perform Experiment 2. Importantly, as the within-subjects comparisons between 
the sessions of the two experiments was crucial for our analysis, participants excluded 
after EEG session of Experiment 2 were also excluded from the analyses of 
Experiment 1.  
After the threshold assessment, data from 29 subjects were excluded from threshold 
analysis and did not take part to the experiments due to failure to find a clear 
modulation of the criterion used in the two sessions (see below), i.e. it was not found 
a frequency value corresponding to 50% of aware responses. Data from 22 participants 
were excluded after the EEG session of Experiment 1 due to excessive artefacts (4 
subjects excluded), or because after the pre-processing the number of trials for each 
condition was less than 10% of total trials (18 subjects excluded). At the end of the 
Experiment 1 the sample was composed of 22 participants. 
At the end of Experiment 2, data from 5 participants were excluded due to excessive 
EEG artefacts (4subjects) or because the number of trials per condition was less than 
10% (1 subject). Thus, the final sample was then composed of seventeen right handed 
participants (13 females, mean age 22.5 ± 2.11). 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. The study was approved by the local ethic 
committee and all the participants gave their written informed consent according to 
the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki prior to participate to the study. All participants were 




The visual stimuli consisted of gabor patches of 2-degree visual angle in diameter 
(Michelson contrast = 0.50), oriented horizontally (0°) or vertically (90°). The 
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frequency of the stimuli was determined individually for each participant before the 
EEG experiment by means of a threshold assessment procedure consisting of two 
different sessions. Within each session seven different pre-selected horizontal 
frequency values (4.5, 5.0, 6.0, 6.5, 7.0, 7.5, 8.5 cycles/degree) and seven different pre-
selected vertical frequency values (4.5, 5.0, 6.0, 6.5, 7.0, 7.5, 8.5 cycles/degree) were 
randomly presented to the participants on a grey background. All Gabor stimuli were 
generated using MATLAB (The Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA), while stimulus 
presentation and behavioural data collection in the threshold assessment and EEG 
experiment were performed using E-prime 2.0 software (E-Prime Psychology 
Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, USA).  
At the end of the threshold procedure one horizontal frequency value and one vertical 
frequency value corresponding to the value at which the participant reported to have 
seen the stimulus on 50% of presentations were obtained for each participant. These 
values were then used in the subsequent EEG experiment. 
 
 
2.4 Threshold assessment 
Participants were welcomed and seated in a light-dimmed room in front of a 17 in. 
CRT monitor (with a resolution 1024 x 768 and a refresh rate of 85 Hz) at a viewing 
distance of 57 cm, with their head supported by a chin-rest in order to secure head 
position and stabilize fixation.  
The absolute thresholds were estimated for each participant by adopting a three 
alternative forced choice task in combination with the method of constant stimuli.  
Subjects completed two separate sessions of threshold assessment, which were 
identical in terms of the stimuli employed but different in terms of decision criterion 
requirement. In one session (liberal session), participants were asked to report the 
orientation of the gabor whenever they had a minimal impression, while in the other 
session (conservative session), subjects were instructed to respond only if they were 
sure of having detected the orientation of the stimulus.  
Other than decision criterion the procedure was identical in both sessions (Figure4): 
on each trial, a central fixation cross followed by a brief warning tone (1000 Hz) was 
presented to the subject. Then, after a random interval (ranging from 300to 500 ms) 
one of the preselected stimuli appeared for 36 ms on a grey background (3.9 cd/m2) 
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at the top center of the screen. Subjects had to report by pressing one of three different 
keys whether they perceived a vertical gabor, a horizontal gabor or whether they did 
not know which the orientation of the stimulus was. No feedback was provided. 
Each session was divided into six blocks for a total of 462 trials. Each block consisted 
of 77 trials, including 70 target trials (each Gabor’s frequency was tested five times), 
and 7 catch trials (in which both horizontal and vertical spatial frequencies were 
superimposed). The order of the two sessions was counterbalanced among 
participants. 
At the end of the procedure, a horizontal frequency value and a vertical frequency 
value yielding 50% aware responses (i.e. all responses excluding the “I don’t Know” 
response, which is considered the unaware response) were calculated for each of the 
two sessions (liberal and conservative). Then, the mean between the two horizontal 
values and the mean between the two vertical values were calculated separately and 




2.5 EEG Experiment 
All participants took part in two experimental sessions with a short break of 15 minutes 
between them. Both sessions were identical in protocol, except that subjects were 
asked to adopt a different decision criterion on each session. In one session 
participants were asked to adopt a conservative criterion while in the other session 
they were instructed to adopt a more liberal criterion. The stimuli were those 
determined by previous individual threshold assessment. 
The trial sequence started with a fixation cross, followed by a 1000 Hz warning tone, 
and a variable random interval (300-500 ms). Then, randomly, a near threshold vertical 
or horizontal gabor patch was presented on the top center of the screen for 36 ms. 
After each stimulus, participants had to report (Figure 4), as fast and as accurate they 
could, by pressing one of three buttons, whether the stimulus was horizontal, vertical, 
or whether they did not know which was the orientation of the stimulus. The order of 
the two sessions was counterbalanced across participants. Each experimental session 
consisted of 6 blocks. Each block consisted of 77 trials (35 horizontal Gabor’s, 35 




Figure 4. Experimental procedure: First, a fixation cross was presented for 400 ms 
followed by an acoustic tone lasting 150 ms. Then after a random interval of 300 or 
500ms the stimulus was presented on the top center of the screen for 36 ms. At this 
point participants had to discriminate the orientation of the stimulus by pressing a 
button on a keyboard. 
 
 
2.6 EEG Acquisition and event-related potential (ERP) analysis  
Raw EEG signal was continuously recorded with a BrainAmp system (Brain Products 
GmbH, Munich, Germany – Brain Vision Recorder) using an EasyCap consisting of 
64 Ag/AgCl electrodes arranged according to the 10-10 International System 
(EasyCap, GmbH, Herrshing, Germany). All electrode sites were referenced on-line 
to the right mastoid and re-referenced off-line to the mastoid average, while electrode 
Afz served as ground.  Additionally, four electro-oculogram (EOG) electrodes were 
placed immediately adjacent to the left and right canthi and above and below the right 
eye to monitor for horizontal and vertical eye movements respectively. All electrodes’ 
impedance was kept below or equal to 5KΩ. The data were acquired with a sampling 
rate of 1000 Hz (with a time constant of 10 s as a low cut-off and a high cut-off of 250 
Hz. 
Raw EEG data were initially processed off-line using BrainVision Analyzer 2 (Brain 
Products, Gilching, Germany). Data were down-sampled to 500 Hz, high-pass filtered 
 20 
with a cut-off at 1.0 Hz (12 dB/octave) and a 50 Hz notch filter was applied to remove 
power line-noise.  
The data were then exported to EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004), segmented 
into epochs (-1000 to 1000 ms) and visually inspected to detect segments and channels 
with large artifacts. Independent component analysis (ICA) for data decomposition 
was then performed separately for each subject using the InfoMax algorithm (Bell and 
Sejnowski, 1995) to separate neural activity from artifacts. Data were then low pass 
filtered at 40 Hz (12 dB/octave), segmented into epochs starting 200 ms before 
stimulus onset and continuing until 800 ms after stimulus presentation. The 200 ms 
activity before stimulus onset was used as the baseline. Before averaging, each trail was 
visually inspected to check for residual artifacts and then down-sampled to 250 Hz. 
Finally, stimulus-locked grand average ERPs for aware (those trials in which the 
participant reported to have detected the stimulus) and unaware trials were calculated 
separately for each criterion (conservative and liberal).  
 
 
2.7 Analysis  
The behavioral analyses were conducted using the R programming language 
(http://www.r-project.org, version 3.5.1).  Mean percentage of aware responses for 
each criterion were analyzed with a t-test for paired samples. A Paired t-test was also 
performed on the mean percentage of correct responses to determine whether 
accuracy levels for each session were significantly higher than chance (50%). 
The N2 component was measured from electrode Cp5, while the P3 from electrode 
Cpz. The electrodes used for statistical analyses were selected according to previous 
studies (Koivitsto and Revonuso, 2010; Tagliabue et al., 2017) and on the basis, that 
when looking at the difference waves they showed the highest peak amplitude for the 
N2 and P3 components.  
Grand average ERPs were submitted to a 2-way repeated-measure ANOVA with 
factors Awareness (Aware, Unaware) and Criterion (Conservative, Liberal). Main 
effects were detected with the Study procedure implemented in EEGLAB (Delorme 
and Makeig, 2004). To explain the interaction between the two factors, follow-up 
analyses on the N2 and P3 mean peak amplitude were then conducted with the Mass 
Univariate ERP Toolbox (Groppe et al., 2011) implemented in Matlab. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Threshold assessment  
Figure 5 shows the psychometric function representing the percentage of aware 
answers as a function of the spatial frequency of the stimuli, for the conservative and 
the liberal sessions (vertical and horizontal stimuli collapsed together). As expected, 
the proportion of aware responses increased as a function of frequency intensities in 
both the conservative and the liberal session. The mean spatial frequency value related 




Figure 5. Psychometric function: Psychometric function for the decision criteria 
representing the average number of aware responses as a function of the spatial 
frequency (cycles per degree) of the stimuli (horizontal and vertical Gabor’s collapsed 
together). The blue line indicates the threshold function obtained for the conservative 
criterion, while the red line depicts the threshold function obtained for the liberal 
criterion. Each dot indicates the mean performance at each frequency value for the 





The aim of threshold assessment was to find a horizontal frequency value and a vertical 
frequency value that participants should, on average, detect on 50% all trials. To do 
that, we firstly estimated a threshold for vertical and horizontal stimuli on each session 
(conservative and liberal). Then, the mean between the two horizontal values and the 
mean between the two vertical values were calculated separately and used as spatial 
frequency of the target stimuli employed during the EGG sessions of Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2. Following this procedure, the mean spatial frequency values 
obtained were 6,71 cycles/degree for the horizontal Gabor’s and 6,04 cycles/degree 
for the vertical Gabor's. 
 
 
3.2 EEG Experiment behavioral results 
As shown in Figure 6A participants reported to be aware of the stimuli more frequently 
in the liberal session 68.76% than in the conservative session 48.61%, (t = -5.6281, df 
= 16, p-value = 0.0000377). In other words, participants were able to set their decision 
criterion differently in the two sessions, thus confirming that our manipulation of post-
perceptual processes was successful.  
 
 
Figure 6. Behavioral results: (A) Mean percentage of aware responses for the 
Conservative and Liberal sessions. Error bars represent standard errors. (B) Mean 




One sample t-tests were run to check whether the mean percentage of correct 
responses (Figure 6B) on each session were significantly greater than chance level. 
Results showed that accuracy was higher than 50% on both sessions Conservative and 
Liberal (all ps < 0.001). Moreover, as shown in Figure 5B observers were more 
accurate in the conservative session (92.42%) compared to the liberal session (86.76%), 
(t = 4.6376, df = 16, p-value = 0.0002738). 
Participants detected the catch trials with a 94.55% accuracy in the conservative 
session, and a 95.52% accuracy in the liberal session, thus indicating the reliability of 
their performance. 
Altogether these results indicate that the performance of the participants across the 
two sessions differed significantly in terms of subjective report and accuracy.  
 
 
3.3 ERPs results 
Figure 7A and Figure 7D show Aware and Unaware grand average ERPs for the N2 
and P3 components measured from electrode Cp5 and Cpz, respectively. The N2 
component emerged as an enhanced negativity peaking at about 280-380 ms post-
stimulus at lateral-parietal electrodes of the left hemisphere (Figure 7C). The P3 
component was visible as a more positive voltage distributed over almost all electrodes 
(Figure 7F) in the time-window between ~400-600 ms. Figure 7B and Figure 7E show 
topographic scalp maps for the VAN and the LP components. These maps were 
calculated by subtracting the ERP to unaware responses from ERP to aware responses 
in the time window of 306-326 ms for the VAN, and the time window of 442-542 ms 
for the LP. Figure 8A and Figure 8B show grand-averaged ERP from electrode Cp5 
and Cpz for each decision criterion. Figure 9A and Figure 9B show the VAN and the 
LP components measured from the aware minus unaware difference waves at the 
electrode Cp5 and Cpz. The VAN can be observed as an enhanced negativity in the 
time-window of 240-340 ms. The LP is associated with an increased positivity in the 







The ANOVA measuring the effect of conscious detection on N2 amplitude revealed 
a significant main effect for awareness (p < 0.05), indicating that aware responses were 
associated with a more negative peak amplitude than unaware responses, especially 
over temporal and parietal lateral electrodes. Difference waves calculated on this time-
window revealed a negative peak that corresponded to the VAN component. In 
contrast, there was no main effects of the decision criterion on N2 amplitude (p > 
0.05) nor an interaction effect, thus suggesting that post-perceptual processes had no 




The P3 component showed a significant main effect for Awareness (p < 0.05), 
indicating that aware responses were associated with a larger P3 if compared to 
unaware responses. Thus, difference waves confirmed the presence of the LP 
component peaking over almost all electrode sites.  In addition, P3 showed a main 
effect of the decision criterion (p < 0.05), revealing that P3 amplitude was significantly 
larger for the Liberal vs the Conservative condition, particularly over central areas. 














Figure 7. ERPs: (A) Grand average ERP for aware and unaware responses for 
electrode Cp5. Gray area indicates the time-window for the N2 component. (B) Scalp 
topography map showing the ERP difference between Aware and Unaware responses 
in the VAN time-window (306-326 ms). (C) Scalp map of p values showing significant 
electrodes when comparing aware and unaware responses in the VAN time-window (p 
< 0.05). (D) Grand average waveforms in response to aware and unaware stimuli for 
electrode Cpz. Gray box marks the component of interest (P3). (E) Scalp topographic 
maps of aware minus unaware difference waves for the LP component in the time 
window of 442-542ms. (F) Scalp map of p values showing significant electrodes when 
















Figure 8. Grand average ERPs for each criterion: (A) Grand average 
waveforms in response to each criterion for electrode Cp5 (N2 
component). (B) Grand average waves in response to each criterion for 




















































Figure 9. ERP difference waves: (A) Difference waves (aware minus 
unaware trials) related to Conservative and Liberal criteria for electrode 




In this experiment we investigated whether our manipulation of the decision criterion 
would produce a corresponding modulation on P3 amplitude. This would implicate 
that P3 does not reflect only visual awareness but that it shares common neural 
resources with decision-making processes. 
Behavioural results showed that our manipulation of the decision criterion induced a 
perceptual decision bias in the participants, resulting in an increased observers’ 
propensity for aware responses in the liberal session than in the conservative session. 
As in previous studies (Koivisto et al., 2008; Tagliabue et al., 2016), after contrasting 
ERPs to detected and undetected stimuli it was possible to isolate the VAN, which 
was largest over temporo-parietal areas. VAN was followed by an enhanced positivity, 
the LP, which was prominent over almost all electrode sites.  
Importantly, the ERP analyses revealed that the P3 component was sensitive to the 
manipulation of the decision criterion, with a larger P3 amplitude for the liberal 
compared to the conservative condition, whereas the N2 was not affected by the 
decision criterion. These results suggest that neural activity expressed by P3 wave may 
reflect post-perceptual processes related to response criterion setting rather than a 
mere neural correlate of consciousness.  
To further corroborate our hypothesis that P3 reflects post-perceptual processes we 
run a second experiment to examine whether in a no bias condition (Own session), in 
which the participants are not forced to adopt a specific decision criterion, ERP would 
distribute differently on the N2 and P3 time-window. If effectively in the first 
experiment the P3 was sensitive to the bias effect induced by the manipulation of the 
decision criterion, one would expect to find some differences in the topography or in 
the time-course of the P3 between the bias condition (Experiment 1) and the no bias 









5. Experiment 2 
5.1 Material and Methods 
5.2 Subjects and Stimuli 
The sample obtained at the end of Experiment 1 was asked to participate in 
Experiment 2. Moreover, the same stimuli obtained during threshold assessment and 
used in Experiment 1 were employed in this experiment.  
 
 
5.3 EEG Experiment 
EEG setting was identical to Experiment 1. Participants completed one experimental 
session identical in structure to each session of Experiment 1. Participants performed 
the same task as in Experiment 1, but this time there was no a decision criterion bias 
imposed and participants were free to respond whenever they detected a stimulus 
(Own-criterion session).  
 
 
5.4 EEG acquisition and Event Related Potential (ERP) analysis 
EEG recording setting and data pre-processing were the same as in Experiment 1. At 
the end of the pre-processing procedure stimulus-locked grand-average ERPs for 
aware and unaware trials were computed separately for each condition. 
 
 
5.5 Analysis  
Behavioral and ERPs data from Experiment 2 were compared with those of 
Experiment 1. The proportion of aware responses for the own-criterion session were 
compared to those of each session of the Experiment 1 (Conservative session and 
Liberal session) by means of paired two-tailed t-tests. Paired t-tests were also used to 
test whether accuracy score obtained in the own-criterion session was significantly 
different the conservative and liberal sessions. 
As in Experiment 1, grand average ERP waveforms were submitted to a two-way 
repeated-measure ANOVA with Criterion (Conservative, Liberal, Own) and 
Awareness (Aware; Unaware) as within-subject factors. Main effects were detected 
with the Study procedure implemented in EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) 
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while post-hoc analyses were conducted with the Mass Univariate ERP Toolbox 
(Groppe et al., 2011) implemented in Matlab. The time-window and electrodes used 
for analysis of the N2 and P3 components were chosen based on inspection of grand 

































6.1 Behavioral results 
 
In the own criterion session, participants reported to have detect the stimuli during 
78.64% of all trials (Figure 10A) with an 88.76% accuracy (Figure 10B). One sample t-
tests performed to check whether accuracy was greater than 50% confirmed that 
participants’ performance was significantly above chance level (p < 0.001) in the own-
criterion session. Catch trials were detected with a 97,48% accuracy, thus revealing the 
reliability of the participants performance. 
Behavioral data from Experiment 2 were then compared with corresponding data 
obtained in Experiment 1. For the accuracy measures, results indicated that 
participants were more accurate in the own-criterion session than in the conservative 
session (p = 0.005958). Whereas, no significant difference on accuracy scores was 
observed among the own-criterion session and the liberal session (p = 0.1695). 
There was a significant difference in the proportion of aware responses between the 
own-criterion session and the conservative session ( p = 0.000062). Whereas, between 
the own-decision criterion session and the liberal session there was not a significant 
difference in the mean proportion of aware responses ( p = 0.08199). 
 
 
Figure 10. Behavioral results: (A) Mean percentage of aware responses for the 
Conservative, Liberal and Own sessions. Error bars represent standard errors. (B) 
Mean percentage of correct responses for each session. Error bars represent 




6.2 ERPs results 
Figure 11A and Figure 11D show ERP waves from Cp5 and Cpz electrodes for Aware 
and Unaware responses. Visual inspection of the grand average ERP revealed the 
presence of the N2 and the P3 component peaking respectively at 308 ms (N2) and 
458 ms (P3) after stimulus presentation. The effect of awareness on N2 and P3 
components was quite similar to that observed in Experiment 1. In fact, Aware 
responses elicited a more negative N2 and a more positive P3 than Unaware responses. 
Figure 11C and Figure 11F illustrate electrodes with statistically significant differences 
(p < 0.05) between aware and unaware responses for the VAN and LP components, 
respectively.  Figure 11B and Figure 11E show the scalp distribution of differences 
(µV) between Aware and Unaware stimuli for the VAN and LP time-window. Figure 
12A and Figure 12B show grand-averaged ERP from electrode Cp5 and Cpz for each 
decision criterion. Figure 13A and Figure 13B show the VAN and the LP component 
measured from the aware minus unaware difference waves at the electrode Cp5 and 




For the N2 components, the results of the within-subject ANOVA with factor 
awareness showed that aware responses were associated with an increased N2 
amplitude than unaware responses (p < 0.05) over a cluster of temporo-parietal 
electrodes located on the left hemisphere. The repeated measures ANOVA with 
criterion as within-subject factor showed that N2 amplitude was sensitive to the effect 
of the criterion (p < 0.05). Pairwise comparisons showed that the component was 
larger (more negative) in the Own session if compared to the Liberal (p < 0.05) and to 




Corresponding analysis on the P3 time-window showed a main effect of awareness 
indicating that aware responses elicited an increased positivity compared to unaware 
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responses (p < 0.05). The largest effect was measured in the time-window of 400-600 
ms and was present over almost all electrodes sites. There was also a significant main 
effect of the criterion (p < 0.05) on P3 amplitude. Follow-up analyses indicated that 
the P3 elicited by the Own criterion was significantly more positive than the P3 elicited 
by the Conservative criterion, and that the P3 of the Liberal criterion was significantly 















Figure 11. ERPs: (A) Grand average ERP for aware and unaware stimuli for electrode 
Cp5. Gray area indicates the time-window for the N2 component. (B) Scalp 
topography map showing the electrophysiological difference between aware and 
unaware responses in the VAN time-window (298-318 ms). (C) Scalp map of p values 
showing significant electrodes when comparing aware and unaware responses in the 
VAN time-window (p < 0.05). (D) Grand average waveforms in response to aware 
and unaware stimuli for electrode Cpz. Gray box marks the component of interest 
(P3). (E) Scalp topographic maps of aware minus unaware difference waves for the 
LP component in the time window of 438-538ms. (F) Scalp map of p values showing 
significant electrodes when comparing aware and unaware responses in the LP time-




















Figure 12. Grand average ERPs for each criterion: (A) Grand average 
waveforms in response to each criterion for electrode Cp5. Gray box 
indicates the component of interest (N2) (B) Grand average waves in 
response to each criterion for electrode Cpz. Grey box marks the 


















Figure 13. ERP difference waves: (A) Difference waves (aware minus 
unaware trials) related to each criterion for electrode Cp5. (B) Grand 
average difference waves related to each criterion for electrode Cpz. 
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7. Discussion 
Behavioral and ERP results obtained in this experiment were analyzed together with 
those obtained in Experiment 1. The aim of this experiment was to examine whether 
in a condition in which decision processes were not manipulated, the N2 and P3 
components would distribute differently from Experiment 1.  
As in Experiment 1, the contrast to ERPs to detected and undetected stimuli revealed 
the presence of the VAN, which was followed by an enhanced positivity, 
corresponding to the LP wave.  
Importantly, behavioral results suggested that participants shifted their decision 
criterion depending on the experimental session. In the conservative session, the 
decreased proportion of aware responses and an increased accuracy suggests that 
participants effectively adopted a more conservative strategy compared to the liberal 
and own-criterion sessions. While, on the contrary, their own criterion was not 
different from the liberal criterion. These results were also reflected on the 
electrophysiology of P3 component revealing an enhanced positivity over central areas 
associated with the liberal and own criteria if compared to the conservative criterion. 
In addition, a stronger N2 was elicited by the own criterion if compared to the liberal 
and conservative criteria. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that experimentally induced manipulation of 
decision criterion is associated with a reduced N2 amplitude. On the contrary, when 
sensory information was relevant for the task (own session) a stronger N2 component 
was observed. These results suggest that N2 represents the best predictor of visual 
















8. General discussion 
Two patterns of brain activity expressed by the N2 and the P3 ERP components have 
been reported in the literature as the main neural correlates of consciousness (Koivisto 
and Revonuso, 2010; Railo et al., 2015). However, one of the major problems of the 
classical paradigms used in visual awareness studies arises from the fact that observers’ 
report is essential for establishing the quality of a perceptual experience, for example 
whether the participant saw or not a visual stimulus. This means that neural correlates 
that support awareness may be confounded with neural processes involved in 
accessing and reporting perceptual information (Aru et al., 2012; De Graaf et al., 2012). 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether the P3 component may actually index 
post-perceptual processes (NCC-co) related to decision bias. Our major finding was 
that, the amplitude of P3 was modulated by the decision criterion, suggesting that P3 
might indeed reflect brain activity occurring after that awareness has emerged.  
In this series of experiments, we experimentally induced a decision bias to create an 
experimental condition in which the physical stimulation of the retina was held 
constant while post-perceptual processes required to carry out the task varied across 
sessions. Thus, the experimental conditions differed between each other in decision 
making requirements, that is a post-perceptual process. This manipulation allowed us 
to examine the possible influences of post-perceptual processes over the time course 
of neural responses. 
Behavioral results showed that the manipulation of decision criterion had an effect on 
reported “aware” trials, as the proportion of aware responses was greater in the own 
and liberal sessions as compared to the conservative session. The behavioral results 
are in line with the view that criterion shifts are obtained by strategically biasing sensory 
evidence depending on task demand (Klosterman et al., 2018). Thus, the decision to 
give more or less aware responses was based on comparing available sensory evidence 
with an internal criterion and occurred after the subject was already conscious of the 
stimulus (i.e. post-perceptually).  
Consistent with previous ERP studies (Railo et al., 2011; Koivisto et al., 2016b), we 
found that aware responses elicited more robusts N2 and P3 waves compared to 
unaware responses. 
Importantly we found that the amplitude of P3 component was modulated by the 
manipulation of decision criterion. It was reduced in the conservative session as 
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compared to the own and liberal sessions. In other word, the same modulatory effect 
induced by the manipulation of decision criterion at behavioral level was reflected on 
the electrophysiology of P3 component. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that the 
order of experiments (Experiment 2 was performed always at least two weeks after 
Experiment 1) may have acted as a confounding variable an influenced the results. 
However, these results suggest that neural mechanisms underlying criterion setting 
occurred during the P3 time-window. Indeed, since perceptual decision are taken after 
comparing sensory evidence with an internal criterion, the modulation observed in the 
P3 time-window must be attributed to decision-making processes. This is consistent 
with the view that P3 reflects access consciousness (Block, 2005), that is the availability 
of perceptual information to cognitive system for reporting purpose and action 
planning (Pitts et al., 2014a; Boly et al., 2017).  
In addition, ERP results showed that the amplitude of the N2 was greater in the own 
session compared to the conservative and liberal sessions. Thus, in the own session, 
in which participants were requested to base their responses solely on sensory input, a 
bigger N2 was observed. This result suggest that the N2 component might reflect 
participants’ awareness to the presence of the stimuli.  
Our findings are in line with the results obtained by recent studies investigating the 
role of the P3 in perceptual decision. Kelly and colleagues (Kelly and O’ Connell, 2013) 
identified an ERP component called Centro parietal positive potential (CPP), an 
equivalent to P3 wave (Twomey et al., 2015), which has been related to the 
accumulation of sensory evidence. It has been suggested that the amplitude of the CPP 
component influences decision making performance and the timing of decision report. 
A general implication of this finding is that P3 or CPP does not correlate solely with 
stimulus identification, but it reflects all the identification processes leading to a 
decision.  
Additional findings come from signal detection experiments. In a study on NCC 
(Koivsto and Grassini, 2016) the authors investigated whether sensitivity index (d’) 
and response bias (c), computed on the basis of participants awareness rating, 
correlated with the VAN and LP components. Interestingly, the authors found that 
the better the subjects were in discriminating between the presence or the absence of 
the stimuli, the larger was the VAN. On the contrary, the LP did not correlate to 
awareness sensitivity but to response bias, where a conservative response bias was 
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associated with a more reduced LP amplitude. These results were interpreted by the 
authors as an indication that the VAN correlates with visual awareness, whereas brain 
activity expressed in the P3 time-window was related to decision mechanisms 
concerning processing of task-relevant features in working memory.  
In conclusion, the results of the present study suggest that the increased negativity 
occurring around 200 ms reflected by the VAN component represents the best 
predictor of visual awareness. The later activity, instead, expressed by the P3 may 
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